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Nationhood, International Obligation and
Federal Structure: An Historical Overview
of the Australian Experience
David D. Knoll*
I. Introduction
Today the interest of Americans investing abroad in the Pacific
Basin is rising at a rapid rate. Resource-rich Australia is a prime
target for the investment dollar. Since World War 11 the United
States and Australia have developed a close relationship based upon
both military and economic cooperation. With the recent upturn in
the economies of both countries, developments in the minerals, oil,
gas and manufacturing industries make Australia attractive to inves-
tors. From a political perspective, as the most stable nation in the
Asia-Pacific region and because of the common English language
and heritage, Australia is the most familiar target for such
investment.
Australia is a federal state, modeled in part on the United
States of America. This article focuses on the interrelationship be-
tween the Commonwealth Government of Australia and the Austra-
lian state governments with regard to external affairs. Although the
sources of law do not all arise out of the trade and investment area,
it is in that sphere that these issues have their most frequent and
significant impact. For example, a United States corporation may
wish to conduct a minerals exploration venture in Australia. After
making a successful find, it may wish to mine, process and export the
minerals. This involves setting up mining and production facilities, as
well as rail or road transportation to a port and port facilities (if
those facilities are not already in existence). Each of these steps will
necessitate government contracts with the Australian state govern-
ment involved. Unless the foreign investors' specific plans are already
permitted under existing legislation, in order to cooperate with the
investors, the state government will need to pass an enabling statute.
Also, not only will the investment need to be approved by the For-
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eign Investment Review Board of the Australian Department of the
Treasurer,1 but it will also have to comply with existing Common-
wealth. legislation or, if that is not possible, be exempted from
compliance.
The foregoing cursory outline of the process encountered by the
foreign investor in Australia serves to highlight the need for coopera-
tion from both the Commonwealth Government and the relevant
state government. If the two governments do not agree, is the pro-
posed project to proceed? Seldom does this question not require the
appraisal of the constitutional issues involved. This article seeks to
present and analyze the relevant issues from an historical perspec-
tive. After introducing the Australian Constitutional framework, ma-
jor judicial decisions will be discussed. The conclusion is reached
that the present constitutional position of the Australian judiciary
can now be stated with some clarity and precision so as to effectively
guide the foreign investor and others upon whom the issues may im-
pact. It is probably fair to say that Australia keenly invites foreign
investment but through legislative, executive and judicial means en-
sures that domestic as well as foreign interests are protected in a
carefully regulated environment.
The landmark decision of the High Court of Australia in the
Commonwealth of Australia v. State of Tasmania (Franklin Dam
Case)2 has been and will continue to be the subject of attention of
lawyers and scholars' interested in the internal and external aspects
of Australian federalism. This decision's immediate effect was to
stop the construction of a dam in the southwestern Tasmanian wil-
derness area. The court held the construction of the dam to be in
violation of validly enacted Commonwealth law. Neither the govern-
ment of the State of Tasmania nor its instrumentality, the Hydro-
Electric Corporation, were constitutionally exempt from the applica-
tion of that law. This law had been enacted to implement a multilat-
eral treaty, The Convention for the Protection of the World Cul-
l. This is now a fairly straightforward and cooperative process. For the statute appli-
cable to the regulation of foreign investment, see Foreign Takeovers Act, AUSTL. C. AcTs
(1975).
2. 46 AUSTL. L. R. 625 (1983), see infra text accompanying notes 148-203. [hereinaf-
ter cited as the Franklin Dam Case].
3. For further commentaries addressing the internal and external aspects of Austra-
lian Federalism, see M. COPER. THE FRANKLIN DAM CASE (1983); Byrnes, The Implementa-
tion of Treaties in Australia After the Tasmanian Dams Case: The External Affairs Power
and the Influence of Federalism, 8 B. C. INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 275-339 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as Brynes]; Byrnes and Charlesworth, Federalism and the International Legal Order:
Recent Developments in Australia, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 622-40 (1985); Symposium (on the
Franklin Dam Case), 14 FED. L. REV. 199 (1984); Rumble, Federalism. External Affairs and
Treaties: Recent Developments in Australia, 17 CASE W. J. INT'L L. 1 (1985); Goldring, Dams
or Floodgates, 8 LEGAL SERV. BULL. 156 (1983); Lane, The Federal Parliament's External
Affairs Power: The Tasmanian Dam Case, 57 AUST'L L. J. 554 (1983).
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tural and Natural Heritage (UNESCO),4 and it effectively subjected
the Australian federal compact to the obligations and benefits of the
treaty.
On the jurisprudential plane, the decision's contribution is far
reaching indeed. Australia's international personality, including her
ability to undertake and to fulfill her role in world affairs, has been
reinforced. The difficulties faced by a supreme municipal court in
treaty interpretation and the application of public international law
have been brought into full view by this decision. The court finely
balanced the preservation of a federal structure and the need for uni-
fied action in matters with international repercussions. Seen in the
light of history, the Franklin Dam Case is an evolutionary rather
than revolutionary development in each of the above mentioned
problem areas. This history may indeed provide useful guidance to
other Australian federal structures.
II. The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia
The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act" of 1900
(Constitution) provides for the federation of the British colonies of
New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, Tasmania
and Western Australia. The Constitution is a Statute of the British
Parliament sitting at Westminster and is not a formal declaration of
independence by or on behalf of the people of the Commonwealth of
Australia. Indeed, the Commonwealth is still "a self-governing col-
ony" for the purposes of The Colonial Boundaries Act, 1895.6 In-
stead, the Act separates the legislative, 7 executive 8 and judicial pow-
ers9 of the Commonwealth. Its framework provides both an
institutional separation of powers between the three branches of the
Commonwealth Government and a federal division between the
Commonwealth and the states. This framework bears many similari-
ties to the United States Constitution which served as one of the
major models for the draftsmen of the Australian Constitution.
The legislative branch of the Government of Australia is a bi-
cameral parliament consisting of the House of Representatives and
Senate. Section 51 of the Act provides that:
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to
make laws for the peace, order and good government of the
4. 27 U.S.T. No. 37, T.I.A.S. No. 8226, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, reprinted in II I.L.M.
1358 (1972) (without arts. 34-38) [hereinafter cited as Natural Heritage Convention].
5. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., ch. 12 [herein-
after cited as Constitution].
6. Id. at § 8.
7. Id. at ch. I.
8. Id. at ch. II.
9. Id. at ch. Ill.
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Commonwealth with respect to . ..
(i) Trade and commerce with other countries, and among the
states...
(iii) Bounties on the production or export of goods, but so that
such bounties shall be uniform throughout the Commonwealth
(xxix) External Affairs."
Subsections also allocate power to the Commonwealth to legislate
with respect to defense,1 foreign corporations,12 immigration and
emigration,13 relations with the islands of the Pacific, 1 4 and matters
incidental to the execution of any power of each of the arms of the
Commonwealth Government. 5 However, these enumerated powers
are not exclusive of the powers of government exercised by each of
the states. Instead, the enumerated powers are held concurrently by
both systems of government. Unenumerated powers, being the resi-
due, are exclusive to the states. Where concurrent laws on the books
have been enacted by both State and Commonwealth Governments,
any inconsistency is to be resolved in favor of the Commonwealth
legislation.1
6
A similar enumeration does not exist for the executive power of
the Commonwealth. The chief executive, the Governor-General, is
the sovereign head of state acting by and with the authority of the
Crown. The position is not one that is elected. The Governor-General
is appointed by the Crown, presently Queen Elizabeth II, on the rec-
ommendation of the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Aus-
tralia. The Crown's power, as exercised by the Governor-General in
Council acting upon the advice of the elected Prime Minister and his
or her Ministry, extends to the execution of all laws and the proper
functioning of responsible government.1 7
The pinnacle of judicial power is the High Court of Australia
which is a federal supreme court.1 8 The High Court has original ju-
risdiction, inter alia,
10. Id. at § 51.
II. Id. at § 51(vi).
12. Id. at § 51 (xx).
13. Id. at § 51 (xxvii).
14. Id. at § 51 (xxx).
15. Id. at § 51 (xxxix).
16. Id. at § 109.
17. See generally, L. ZINES, COMMENTARIES ON THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION, chs.
I & 2 (1977). The Governor-General in Council is a descriptive term used to describe the
exercise of Executive Authority on the advice of elected Ministers. The Governor-General is
not elected and by unwritten convention acts only on the advice of elected Ministers. This is a
hangover from the unwritten British Constitution. In the United Kingdom too, Her Majesty
acts only upon the advice of her Ministers. The Council is nominally enshrined in Chapter II
of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia entitled "The Executive Government."
18. Constitution, supra note 5, at § 71.
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In all matters -
(i) Arising under any treaty.
(ii) Affecting consuls or other representatives of other
countries . . . when the Commonwealth or its nominee
is a party in interstate suits. 9
Commonwealth legislative powers are limited by Section 92 of
the Act which guarantees the freedom of interstate trade, equal pro-
tection of the states in trade matters pursuant to Section 99, Section
100's protection of reasonable use of the waters of rivers for conser-
vation or irrigation by a State or its residents, Section 116 which
prohibits Commonwealth legislative involvement in matters of reli-
gion, and the implied doctrines of intergovernmental immunities and
the federal balance of powers. These powers and prohibitions have
made varying contributions to the interplay between Australian fed-
eralism and Australia's international legal position.
III. Traditions Die Hard - The Reserved Powers Doctrine
The Commonwealth of Australia has exclusive power over its
public servants, the site of the Parliament and other places acquired
by the Commonwealth for its public purposes20 and it alone can im-
pose customs and excise duties or grant bounties (subsidies) on pro-
duction or exports.2' The only other exclusive legislative powers lie
with the states. The conventional wisdom for the first twenty years of
Australian federation was that any power not enumerated in the
Constitution was reserved to the states.
In D'Emden v. Pedder2 2 the High Court dealt with the reserved
powers doctrine by refusing to hold that one government, federal or
state, was supreme over the. other. The Court in the D'Emden case
rejected the notion that the Commonwealth was an agent of the gov-
ernments of the states. At issue in the case was a tax levied on gov-
ernment employees. The High Court decided that both the states
and the Commonwealth were to be viewed as sovereign in their own
right, and neither should be burdened or fettered by the other.
Neither government was subordinate to the other and neither could
impose a tax which suggested such subordinance.2"
19. Id. at § 75(i). This concept is commonly referred to as diversity jurisdiction.
20. Id. at § 52.
21. Id. at § 90:
22. I C.L.R. 91 (Austl. 1904).
23. The Court declined to draw a line between a reasonable tax and a burdensome one.
In the course of its decision, the Court cited with approval the decision of Chief Justice Mar-
shall of the Supreme Court of the United States in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819), for the proposition that states cannot tax federal agencies. In its decision,
the court asserted that: "We are not driven to the perplexing inquiry, so unfit for the judicial
department, what degree of taxation is the legitimate use, and what degree may amount to
abuse that power." I C.L.R. at 114.
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Under this early doctrine, even the mere attempt of one sover-
eign to burden another could not be condoned. Had this doctrine
remained in favor, the Commonwealth Government would not have
been able to interfere with the states' regulation of private industry,
or vice versa. Thus, the High Court in D'Emden upheld the immu-
nity of one component government in the federation from regulation
by the laws of another component government. This doctrine came
to be known as intergovernmental immunity of Commonwealth and
State action.
In 1920, the powerful judgment in Amalgamated Society of
Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. (Engineers' Case)24 stated
what has since become accepted truth in Australian Constitutional
Law. Intergovernmental immunities are not to be created by a:
vague, individual conception of the spirit of the compact, which
is not the result of interpreting any specific language to be
quoted, nor referable to any recognized principle of the common
law of the Constitution, and which when started, is rebuttable
by an intention of exclusion equally not referable to any lan-
guage of the instrument or acknowledged common law constitu-
tional principle, but arrived at by the court on the opinions of
judges as to hopes and expectations respecting vague external
conditions. This method of interpretation cannot, we think, pro-
vide any secure foundation for Commonwealth or State action,
and must inevitably lead - and in fact has already led - to
divergencies and inconsistencies more and more pronounced by
the decisions accumulated."5
Therefore, intergovernmental immunities, if any exist at all, must be
found in the explicit language of the Constitution.
It should be noted at this point that, in looking at the explicit
language of any statute or Constitutional provision, the Westminster
tradition of statutory interpretation forbids any reference to legisla-
tive history, including the Constitutional Convention Debates and
the United Kingdom Parliamentary Debates over the Australian
Constitution Bill. This tradition has the effect of removing from the
process of statutory construction any inquiry into the reserved pow-
ers of the states, an issue that was well debated before the Constitu-
tional Bill was passed. In addition, unlike most opinions from the
24. 28 C.L.R. 129 (Austl. 1920) [hereinafter cited as the Engineers' Case]. The imme-
diate issue in the Engineers' Case, was whether the Parliament had power under Section
51(35) of the Constitution to make laws binding on the States. It was held that it did (Knox
C.J.; Isaacs, Higgins, Rich and Starke J.J.; Gavan Duffy J., dissenting). The Amalgamated
Society of Engineers claimed that it had an "industrial dispute" to which some 844 respon-
dents were parties. These parties included government trading conerns. The engineers wanted
the dispute arbitrated pursuant to Commonwealth Law. The respondents resisted this, claim-
ing that the Commonwealth had no right to legislate for arbitration with respect to them.
25. Id. at 145.
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United States Supreme Court where the majority of justices join in a
common decision, consensus is seldom evident in Australian High
Court judgments. It is therefore necessary to analyze each opinion in
a significant case and "distill some honey from the pollen of the
many flowers." Ensuing sections of this article will perform just such
an analysis with a view to guiding the American investor to a concise
and practical distillation of the Australian legal position as it now
stands.
The notion of reserved powers which was prevalent before the
decision in the Engineers' Case and (set forth in the intergovernmen-
tal immunity doctrine of the D'Emden case), was attacked by Justice
Higgins in his concurring opinion in Engineers'. Justice Higgins
viewed the previous reserved powers concept as an attempt to read
an explicit grant of power to the Commonwealth subject to an im-
plied conception of the Commonwealth as a mere delegatee of states'
powers. Under this interpretation, the power thus delegated can
never be greater than the power held by the source and the "sover-
eignty" given up by the former colonies to the Commonwealth upon
federation was to be construed restrictively. In other words, the
states retained whatever they did not explicitly give up.
The approach adopted by the High Court in the Engineers'
Case, however, was unique in that it was the first case to interpret
initially the explicit and plenary powers granted the Commonwealth
and only then allocate the resultant residue to the states. Given that
the Constitution did not make explicit grants of power to the states,
it was unacceptable to Justice Higgins and the other majority jus-
tices to circumscribe the explicit grants of Commonwealth power by
initially determining the size of the residue.2"
The opinions in the Engineers' Case were based on the fact that
Section 107 of the Constitution does not support the reserved powers
doctrine. Section 107 provides:
Every power of the Parliament of a Colony which has become or
becomes a State shall, unless it is by this Constitution exclu-
sively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth or with-
drawn from the Parliament of the State, continue as at the es-
tablishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the admission or
establishment of the State, as the case may be.2"
This provision does not address the allocation of concurrent powers.
Its function is only to preserve rather than reserve residual state au-
26. Id. at 154. See also City of Melbourne v. Commonwealth, 74 C.L.R. 31, 83 (Austl.
1947) [hereinafter cited as State Banking Case]; see generally G. SAWER, AUSTRALIAN FED-
ERALISM IN THE COURTS 199 (1967); L. ZINES, THE HIGH COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION II
(1981) [hereinafter cited as ZINES].
27. Constitution, supra note 5, at § 107.
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thority to govern.
The United States Supreme Court case NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.28 offers an interesting comparison. The Court
in that case held that manufacturing is "commerce" as a matter of
United States Constitutional Law, a proposition not hitherto ac-
cepted in Australia. Unlike the United States, the Commonwealth
lacks the power to regulate nationwide employment conditions under
the commerce clause. Whereas in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. regulation by the United States federal government of unfair
labor practices was held to be appropriate because a disruption of
manufacturing would affect interstate commerce, in the Australian
Engineers' Case, federal power over labor arbitration was also at
stake. The most vital similarity however is not so superficial. Both
cases showed a judicial willingness to adjudicate questions of degree,
namely, how far federal regulation may extend before state power
and sovereignty effectively disappears. The earlier reluctance to
tackle the question of degree exhibited in McCulloch v. Maryland9
and D'Emden v. Peddero in the United States Supreme Court and
the High Court of Australia respectively, had disappeared. State
sovereignty could be preserved without necessarily forcing the courts
to allow state interests to take priority over federal laws.
Chapter Five of the Constitution, being sections 106 through
120, is entitled "The States," and preserves to the States whatever is
not delegated to the Commonwealth."' It also prohibits discrimina-
tion between states or their residents, 32 provides for full faith and
credit for the laws, public acts and records and judicial proceedings
of each state,33 and requires the Commonwealth, upon request of the
state involved, to provide for the defense of the states, including with
respect to "domestic violence. '34 Influences from the United States'
federal structure are readily discernible. Section 109 of the Austra-
lian Constitution provides as follows: "When a law of a State is in-
consistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail,
and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid. 35
To read Commonwealth laws as subservient to state powers would
belie the supremacy to be accorded to Commonwealth laws.
The Australian courts at first declined to decide the extent of
the powers delegated to the Commonwealth by the Constitution.
28. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
29. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
30. I C.L.R. 91 (Austl. 1904). See supra text accompanying note 21.
31. Constitution, supra note 5, at §§ 106, 107 and 108.
32. Id. § 117.
33. Id. § 118.
34. Id. § 119.
35. Constitution, supra note 5, at § 109. Compare U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2.
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They declared instead that each government was an independent
sovereign entity.3 6 Beginning with the Engineers' Case37 in 1920, the
courts for the first time began to elucidate what powers had been
granted to the Commonwealth and, implicitly, what powers had been
preserved for the states. In making these determinations, the courts
noted the importance of considering those provisions of the Constitu-
tion that specifically preserve certain rights for the states."8 This rec-
ognition that the federal powers and the preserved state powers
could be defined by the courts without interfering with the very sov-
ereignty of the states was only the first step. Through subsequent
cases the scope of federal power became more concrete and the law
grew in the conviction of the supremacy of Commonwealth power
over state action.
IV. The Growth of Commonwealth Power Over State Action
The early decision of the High Court in the State Banking
Case,39 held that the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities pre-
vented Commonwealth law from substantially impeding the exercise
of state legislative power.' The issue in the State Banking Case
arose as the result of a challenge to a Commonwealth requirement
that states do their banking through the Commonwealth Bank (es-
tablished by the Commonwealth Government) or a State-owned
bank but not a private bank set up in competition with the Common-
wealth Bank. The law placed a special disability on states qua states.
Such a law could be characterized as a law "with respect to the
States" and not with respect to a constitutionally valid subject mat-
ter."1 Of course, the Commonwealth was not and is not authorized to
legislate "with respect to the States." Enactments so characterized
are invalid. However, in the Payroll Tax Case' the states were held
to be protected only against Commonwealth law which singled them
out for special treatment or impaired their very capacity to function.
Thus, the focus drifted from impairment of action to impairment of
capacity to act, the former being a necessary side effect of Common-
wealth legislation in areas previously regulated by states.
In the United States, a remarkably similar position was reached
in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association,
36. D'Emden v. Pedder, I C.L.R. 91 (Austl. 1904). See supra note 21 and accompany-
ing text.
37. 28 C.L.R. 129 (Austl. 1920). See also supra text accompanying notes 24-31.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
39. 74 C.L.R. 31 (Austl. 1947).
40. Id. at 75 (opinion by Starke, C.J.).
41. Id. at 61 (opinion by Latham, C.J.). See infra notes 200-02 and accompanying
text.
42. Victoria v. Commonwealth, 122 C.L.R. 353 (1971). For further discussion, see 122
C.L.R. at 382 (opinion by Barwick, C.J.) and 122 C.L.R. at 424 (opinion by Gibbs, J.).
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Inc. 3 where the Supreme Court looked to the impairment of a
state's ability to structure its integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional functions. 4' The Court upheld federal regulation of surface
mining notwithstanding the fact that it overrode concurrent state law
because the federal regulations did not single out the states as their
object.
The extant structure found in both Hodel and the Payroll Tax
Case was a result of tradition rather than of constitutional alloca-
tion. The Payroll Tax Case decision offered the potential for expan-
sion of Commonwealth function. As the body of international con-
ventions grew, it was inevitable that the external affairs power would
be utilized to fill this potential for growth. Recalling the Engineers'
Case, Judge Windeyer in his opinion in the Payroll Tax Case re-
jected the states' argument for full intergovernmental immunity:
The Commonwealth of Australia became a nation. Its na-
tionhood was in the course of time to be consolidated in war, by
economic and commercial integration, by the unifying influence
of federal law, by the decline of dependence upon British naval
and military power and by a recognition and acceptance of ex-
ternal interests and obligations. With these developments the po-
sition of the Commonwealth, the federal government, has
waxed; and that of the states has waned. In law that is a result
of the paramount position of the Commonwealth Parliament in
matters of concurrent power. And this legal supremacy has been
reinforced in fact by financial dominance. That the Common-
wealth would, as time went on, enter progressively, directly or
indirectly, into fields that had formerly been occupied by the
states, was from an early date seen as likely to occur. This was
greatly aided after the decision in Amalgamated Society of En-
gineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd. (Engineers' Case) which
diverted the flow of constitutional law into new channels. I have
never thought it right to regard the discarding of the doctrine of
the implied immunity of the states and other results of the Engi-
neers' Case as the correction of antecedent errors or as the up-
rooting of heresy. To return today to the discarded theories
would indeed be an error and the adoption of a heresy. But that
is because in 1920 the Constitution was read in a new light, a
light reflected from events that had, over 20 years, led to a
growing realization that Australians were now one people and
Australia one country and that national laws might meet na-
tional needs. For lawyers the abandonment of old interpretations
of the limits of constitutional powers was readily acceptable. It
43. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). Accord Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit, 105 S.
Ct. 1005 (1985).
44. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288-89. See also United Transportation Union v. Long Island
Rail Road Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
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means only insistence on rules of statutory interpretation to
which they were well accustomed. But reading the instrument in
this light does not to my mind mean that the original judges of
the High Court were wrong in their understanding of what, at
the time of federation, was believed to be the effect of the Con-
stitution and in reading it accordingly. As I see it the Engineers'
Case, looked at as an event in legal and constitutional history,
was a consequence of developments that had occurred outside
the law courts as well as a cause of further developments
there." 45
V. International Law in Australian Law
Unlike American and like British constitutional tradition, Aus-
tralia does not have a doctrine of self-executing treaties. Interna-
tional law does not form part of Australian law, state or federal,
without formal incorporation. But even though state and federal laws
are to be accorded supremacy over international law in cases of con-
flict,46 statutes are to be interpreted so as not to be inconsistent with
international law whenever possible.4 7 However, notwithstanding this
preference, state acts as well as Commonwealth acts can validly ex-
press an intention to be inconsistent with international law.4 8
Throughout the Australian Commonwealth, then, international
law is not a part of municipal law without formal incorporation, but
international law will be given deference in resolving ambiguities of
statutory construction 49 or lacunae in the common law.50 Real diffi-
culties have begun to arise, however, as international conventions are
incorporated by legislation and additional strains are placed on the
Australian federal-state balance.
VI. The Treaty Making Power
Prior to federation, the colonies developed very little indepen-
dence from Great Britain, the mother country. In the 1870's, postal
conventions with the United States of America were signed by the
colonial postmasters of New South Wales 51 and Queensland52 as
duly authorized signatories. A limited independence in commercial
matters was sought in the 1880's as each of the several Australian
45. 112 C.L.R. 353, 396 (1971).
46. Polites v. Commonwealth, 70 C.L.R. 60, 69 (1945); Croft v. Dunphy, 1933 A.C.
156, 163, 164.
47. Id. See also Blaxam v. Favre, 8 P.D. 101, 107 (1883).
48. Georgini v. Electric Power Transmission Ltd., 80 N.S.W.W.N. 41 (1962).
49. D. and R. Henderson v. Collector of Customs (NSW) 48 AUST'L. L.J.R. 132 (1974)
(opinion by Mason, J.).
50. Chow Hung Ching v. R., 77 C.L.R. 449, 461-63, 470-72, 475-77 (1948).
51. 14 Hertslet's Com. T.S. 1234 (1874).
52. 15 Hertslet's Com. T.S. 460 (1876).
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colonies experienced an expansion in international trade in the wake
of the gold rush and ensuing expansion of new pastoral ventures in
the mid to late nineteenth century. Distant regulation from London
was seen as unresponsive to the needs of local traders, but, nonethe-
less, the negotiation of political treaties was left to the United King-
dom government.
It was believed that colonial freedom of action in the commer-
cial sphere would strengthen imperial ties and quiet any discontent
with centralized decision making emanating from London.5 3 Under
this philosophy the colonies were allowed increasing freedom to enter
into the process of negotiating international commercial treaties.
There were three stages to this development. First, treaties signed by
the United Kingdom were only extended to colonies which gave their
consent to their application. 4 Second, colonies were permitted to de-
nounce the application of a commercial treaty to them.5 Third, a
limited right of participation in the negotiation process was granted
to colonies. This last step did not formally occur until after
federation. 56
The question of treaty making was raised in the Australian con-
stitutional convention debates. An attempt to provide an open-ended
power and to make treaties the supreme law of the land, like Article
Six of the United States Constitution,5 7 failed to gain support.58 The
53. Colonial Conference of 1887, 56. Papers presented to Parliament by Command of
Her Majesty, 461 et. seq.
54. Some examples are the following treaties of commerce to which Great Britain is a
signatory:
Treaty of June 15, 1883, Gr. Brit.-Italy, 163 Parry's T.S. 189 art. 19
(South Australia did not accede); Treaty of November 10, 1886, Gr. Brit.-
Greece, 168 Parry's T.S. 283 art. 17 (New South Wales did not accede); Treaty
of January 21, 1887, Gr. Brit.-Hond., 169 Parry's T.S. 97 art. 14; Treaty of
November 27, 1888, Gr. Brit.-Mex., 171 Parry's T.S. 307 art. 14 (New South
Wales did not accede); Treaty of October 29, 1889, Gr. Brit.-Egypt, 172 Parry's
T.S. 289 art. 15 (only Tasmania and Queensland acceded); Treaty of March 19-
20, 1891, Gr. Brit.-Muscat, 175 Parry's T.S. 35 art. 21 (only Queensland ac-
ceded); Treaty of July 24, 1897, Gr. Brit.-Bulgaria, 185 Parry's T.S. 438 art. 5.
55. See, e.g., Anglo-Spanish Commercial modus vivendi of 1890, 19 Hertslet's Com.
T.S. 843; Protocol of 1897 to the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1874, 24 Hertslet's
Com. T.S. 694; see also Commercial Treaty of 1886, Gr. Brit.-El Sal., 17 Hertslet's Com. 929;
Commercial Treaty of 1899, Gr. Brit.-Uru., 21 Hertslet's Com. T.S. 1120; Commercial Treaty
of 1900, Gr. Brit.-Hond., 89 Brit. & Foreign St. Papers 1121; Commercial Treaty of 1904, Gr.
Brit.-Greece, 98 Brit. & Foreign St. Papers 53; Commercial Treaty of 1908, Gr. Brit.-Liberia,
101 Brit. and Foreign St. Papers 194; Commercial Treaty of 1911, Gr. Brit. & Foreign St.
Papers 266; Commercial Treaty of 1912, Gr. Brit.-Den., 105 Brit. & Foreign St. Papers 267;
Commercial Treaty of 1912, Gr. Brit.-Fr., 105 Brit. & Foreign St. Papers 271; Commercial
Treaty of 1913, Gr. Brit.-Costa Rica, 106 Brit. & Foreign St. Papers 754; Commercial Treaty
of 1913, Gr. Brit.-Nor., 106 Brit. & Foreign St. Papers 807; Commercial Treaty of 1914, Gr.
Brit.-Switz., 107 Brit. & Foreign St. Papers 564.
56. Colonial Conference of 1907, 55. Papers presented to Parliament by Command of
Her Majesty, 41-42.
57. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
58. Official Records of the Debates of the Australian Federal Convention, 2d Sess.,
Sydney, Sept. 2-24, 1897, at 239-240 (1897); Thomson, A United States Guide to Constitu-
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ultimately successful argument was that the potential to act inconsis-
tently with England in the international sphere would create an un-
acceptable disunity within the Empire.5 9 Behind this argument lay
the spectre of the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 186560 which per-
mitted colonial legislation to deviate from the English Common Law,
a mandate quite revolutionary for its time. However, the Validity
Act specifically declared that colonial legislation inconsistent with
imperial legislation would be invalid ab initio. The desire to obtain
commercial independence in the international sphere therefore re-
mained subordinate to imperial unity as political doctrine. Indeed,
when speaking in regard to the Commonwealth of Australia Consti-
tution Bill in the United Kingdom Parliament, the Earl of Selborne
expressed the opinion that the Commonwealth of Australia should
not have any power of legation distinct from the mother country.61
Professor Starke summarized the position in 1900 as follows:
(a) It [the Commonwealth of Australia] possessed no general
independent capacity in the field of foreign affairs;
(b) In regard to commercial treaties, it possessed a right of
semi-independent negotiations, through the medium of the Im-
perial Government, with foreign countries, and an independent
right of adherence to such commercial treaties concluded by
Great Britain as were of benefit to it, coupled with an indepen-
dent right of withdrawal should continued adherence prove
advantageous;
(c) It could not negotiate on matters of defense or high policy
with foreign countries;
(d) It would consult with and endeavor to press a policy or
course of action upon the Imperial Government;
(e) It enjoyed a limited right of representation for trade pur-
poses or technical matters. 2
During 1901, the United Kingdom's Colonial Office63 asked the
Commonwealth Government which treaties ought to be communi-
cated to it and which to state governments, in seeking adherence.
tional Limitations Upon Treaties as a Source of Australian Municipal Law, 13 UW. AUSTL.
L. REV. 110, 120-122 (1977).
59. Id. at 239 (theory espoused by Edmund Barton who later became Prime Minister
of Australia). N.S.W. Commonwealth of Australia (draft constitution bill submitted on behalf
of New South Wales by Mr. Barton). This draft was debated in the New South Wales Legis-
lative Assembly and Legislative Council. These are the two houses of the New South Wales
State Parliament and are roughly equivalent to the United States House of Representatives
and Senate respectively. See id.
60. 28 & 29 Vict., ch. 63 (1865).
61. 85 PARL. DEB. H.L. (4th set.) 578-79 (1900).
62. Starke, The Commonwealth in International Affairs in ESSAYS ON THE AUSTRA-
LIAN CONSTITUTION 341, 346 (R. Mitchell ed. 1952).
63. The Colonial Office was the administrative arm of Her Majesty's Government of
Great Britain which had responsibility for colonial matters and, in particular, colonial self-
government. The Colonial Secretary was the functional head of the Colonial Office.
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The reply of the Commonwealth, which was accepted by the Secre-
tary of State for the Colonies, was that all such communications
were to be addressed to the Commonwealth which would, where ap-
propriate, consult with the states.64 When, in 1902, the Netherlands
complained to Great Britain that the South Australian Government
had declined to arrest the crew of the Dutch ship "Vondel" while the
ship was in her waters, the Colonial Secretary asked the Common-
wealth to obtain an explanation. The reply of the South Australian
Government to the Commonwealth's inquiry was directed to the Sec-
retary in London remonstrating that the Commonwealth had no bus-
iness getting involved in the affair. Mr. Chamberlain, then the Sec-
retary, informed the Lieutenant-Governor of South Australia that it
supported the Commonwealth view that such claims were to be
channelled through the Commonwealth.6" It is worth noting that the
states' claim to jurisdiction over territorial waters was not judicially
negated until 1975.66
It was the opinion of the Crown Law Officers0 7 in 1907 that
international obligations undertaken by the colonies before federa-
tion bound the Commonwealth after federation. Hence, even with
respect to matters for which only the states had legislative compe-
tence the Commonwealth was internationally responsible.6 8
Also in 1907, the Colonial Secretary declined a request to invite
separately the States of New South Wales and Western Australia to
the Colonial Conference of that year. 9 Even within the Empire, the
states were none too willing to cede to the Commonwealth the sole
voice in external affairs. It was feared that once the Commonwealth
was established as the exclusive communications link to London, its
substantive powers would increase at the expense of the states. The
colonies, upon becoming federated states, were reluctant to lose their
traditional links in favor of a unified Commonwealth voice. The
states were of the opinion that if the right to legislate was not exclu-
sive, the right to communicate, especially with London ought not be
64. G. DOEKER, THE TREATY MAKING POWER IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
40 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Doeker].
65. Id. at 41 (citing Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary papers No. 18 of
1903).
66. New South Wales v. Commonwealth, 135 C.L.R. 337 (Austl. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as the Seas and Submerged Lands Case]; see also infra note 75 and accompanying text.
67. The Crown Law Officers were at that time the legal advisors to the new Govern-
ment of the Commonwealth of Australia. Their position is similar to that of an Assistant
Attorney General of the United States.
68. Letter from Crown Law Officers to the Colonial Office (Dec. 2, 1907), reprinted in
A. McNAIR, LAW OF TREATIES, 644-48 (1961). It seemed implicit in the opinion of the Crown
Law Officers that the Commonwealth was not required to then seek approval from London.
This exchange of letters with the Colonial Office however, was but one example of the continu-
ing close consultations between London and the young Commonwealth on matters of interna-
tional importance.
69. DOEKER, supra note 64, at 42.
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exclusive.
The acceptance by the states or for that matter, a large number
of Commownealth parliamentarians, of the doctrine set forth in the
1920 Engineers' Case70 was far from immediate or complete. For
example, in considering whether the Commonwealth could imple-
ment International Labour Organization Conventions and Recom-
mendations, the 1927 Royal Commission on the Federal Court con-
cluded that it could not, because the power to legislate with respect
to labour conditions was reserved to the states.71
The power to conclude such agreements was not however ques-
tioned. It was accepted that the Crown, as represented by the Com-
monwealth, had treaty making power as a prerogative of sovereignty.
Even before the conclusion of World War I, the Imperial War Cabi-
net had resolved to decentralize the Empire's treaty making power
"based upon a full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous na-
tions of an Imperial Commonwealth. '' 72 The Dominions had full rep-
resentation at the Peace Conference of 191973 and separately signed
the Treaty of Versailles. 74 The Balfour Report of the Committee on
Inter-Imperial Relations presented at the Imperial Conference of
1926 affirmed the equality of status of each Dominion with Great
Britain with respect to the whole gamut of external and domestic
affairs. 75
A. The Maturation of Australia's International Personality
In the Seas and Submerged Lands Case7 the recognition that
Australia had to adjust its federal structure as it matured into an
international actor became firmly embedded in judicial policy. The
Seas and Submerged Lands Act, 197377 declared the Common-
wealth sole sovereign as regards the territorial sea, its airspace and
seabed and as regards the continental shelf. In the face of a chal-
lenge by the states, the High Court unanimously upheld the validity
70. 28 C.L.R. 129. See supra text accompanying notes 24-31.
71. See Report of the Royal Commission on the Federal Court in 1927 (1929) and
Proceedings and Minutes of Evidence (1927) at 97, 98, 189, 1249; For a comprehensive review
of Australian implementation of JLD Conventions see Byrnes, supra note 3, at 319-328.
72. War Cabinet Report (1917); Papers presented to Parliament by Command of Her
Majesty 9 (Cmd. 9005 of 1918).
73. H. HALL., THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 180-94 (1920).
74. 1919 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 4 (published as a separate series to the command series
utilized by British Parliament). For the ratification by Australia, see Commonwealth of Aus-
tralia, Parliamentary Papers 1920-21, No. 108 (indexed chronologically).
75. The Summary of Proceedings of the Imperial Conference of 1926 (Cmd. 2768)
cited in A. KEITH, I SELECTED SPEECHES AND DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY
161-70 (1933).
76. 135 C.L.R. 337 (Austi. 1975).
77. The Seas and Submerged Lands Act, 1973. (Editor's Note: Australian statutes are
published in chronological order and bound in annual volumes. This act therefore can be found
in either the 1973 volume or in an alphabetical series).
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of the Commonwealth's claim over the continental shelf. A majority
of the Court 78 upheld the provisions of The Seas and Submerged
Lands Act relating to the territorial sea and its seabed. The external
affairs power of the Commonwealth was held to extend to all things
physically outside Australia, including the continental shelf.7" That
the Commonwealth and not the states should have jurisdiction over
the territorial sea stemmed in part from the states' lack of interna-
tional personality. 0 The states could not, and the Commonwealth
did, enter into the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contig-
uous Zone"1 which the Act sought, in part, to implement.8 2
B. The Impact of Commonwealth-State Negotiations
At the regular conference of State Premiers convened by the
Commonwealth in October 1977,3 it was agreed that:
The states are to be told in all cases and at an early stage of any
treaty discussions that Australia has decided to join; the Com-
monwealth would consult with the states before implementing
legislation was adopted in areas traditionally regulated by the
states so that the states may have first option of passing imple-
menting legislation. With respect to these matters State dele-
gates may join Australian delegations to relevant international
78. 135 C.L.R. 337. The majority consisted of Chief Justice Barwick, Justices
McTiernan, Mason, Jacobs and Murphy; Justices Gibbs and Stephen dissented.
79. Id. at 360 (opinion by Barwick, C.J.); see id. at 470 (opinion by Mason, J.); id. at
497 (opinion by Jacobs, J.); id. at 502 (opinion by Murphy J.).
80. 135 C.L.R. at 373; cf. Bonser v. La Macchia, 122 C.L.R. 177, 185, 222 (Austl.
1969) (states could pass laws regulating fishing within the three mile limit (League Seas) but
only the Commonwealth could regulate the territorial seas); Commonwealth v. Queensland,
135 C.L.R. 298, 335-37 (Austl. 1975); Koowarta v. Bjelke-Peterson, 39 Austl. L.R. 417, 469
(Austl. 1982). In Commonwealth v. Queensland, the Court held that state legislation confer-
ring jurisdiction on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the United Kingdom was
not invalid because it lacked sufficient territorial connection with the State. In 1973, the
Queensland Government petitioned the Queen requesting her to refer to the Judicial Commit-
tee of the Privy Council for advice on a question relating to the seabed adjacent Queensland.
The Australian Government advised the Queen not to refer it and it appears that the British
Government gave her the same advice. Interestingly, the Governor-General was informed that
the Queen, in refusing to refer the matter, had acted on the advice of the Australian Govern-
ment. It appears however, that the State governments were informed that Her Majesty had
acted on the advice of the British Government. The Queen's speech opening the Common-
wealth Parliament indicated that she had received advice from her ministers both in Australia
and in the United Kingdom. 88 H.R. DEB. 6 (1974).
81. The Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958 ap-
pears in Schedule I to the Seas and Submerged Lands Act, 1973 (C'th.).
82. 135 C.L.R. at 351, 364-65, 377, 475-76 and 503.
83. The "Regular Conference of State Premiers" is an annual meeting of each of
Premiers of the states of Australia. These states are: New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania,
South Australia, Western Australia, Queensland, and more recently, Northern Territory. The
Premiers meet with the Prime Minister and Treasurer of the Commonwealth to thrash out
budgetary and economic planning matters on an annual basis. The meetings also discuss other
items of mutual concern to each of the governments. The conferences inevitably are the forum
for discussion of problems of federalism. There is a never-ending tug of war between the states
and the Commonwealth over the right to regulate local and national affairs.
AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
conferences. Federal clauses were to be included in treaties in
appropriate cases .
4
The agreement setting up Commonwealth-State consultations
formalized a process which had been developing for some years. As
to international conferences, a states' adviser was included in the
Australian delegation to the Seventh Session of the Law of the Sea
Conference."6 The states also continue to maintain overseas repre-
sentatives for tourism and trade promotion. 6 The agreed pattern ap-
pears to be one of federal dominance tempered with a benevolent,
cooperative federalism.
VII. International Responsibility - A Federal Concern
In 1929, Australia, in reply to a League of Nations' question-
naire preparatory to the holding of a conference for the codification
of international law, formally stated that the Commonwealth Gov-
ernment had sole responsibility for the making and implementation
of treaties.8" In 1931, the Statute of Westminster" permitted Do-
minions to legislate inconsistently with imperial legislation and ren-
dered the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 inapplicable to the
Dominions. 9 The Australian states were excepted under special pro-
visions 0 allowing them to remain subject to the Colonial Laws Va-
lidity Act. By preserving the rule preventing the states from enacting
laws inconsistent with imperial legislation, the states had hoped to
maintain a link with London which would counter the growth of
Commonwealth power.
The assertion of independence by the Commonwealth was not
given the wholehearted support of the states for whom the now de-
caying imperial unity was the only link to the international arena
which was not dependent upon Commonwealth action. Federal ten-
sions were highlighted at the Australian Legal Convention in Mel-
bourne in 1935.91
84. Transcript, Press Conference by Prime Minister Fraser (Oct. 21, 1977), cited in
Burmeister, The Australian States and Participation in Foreign Policy Process, 9 FED. L.R.
257, 281 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Burmeister].
85. See id.
86. All states have representatives in London. In Tokyo, all but Tasmania are repre-
sented. Only New South Wales is represented in New York. New South Wales and Victoria
are represented in Bonn. Only South Australia maintains representatives in Hong Kong,
Djakarta, Singapore and Kuala Lampur. See Burmeister, supra note 84, at 273.
87. League of Nations Doc. C.75/m.69 1929, at 175 (1929). Cf. U.N. GAOR, (29th
Session) A/C.6/SR 1494 (1974) (statement by Mr. Coles, delivered on November 7, 1974).
88. 21 & 22 Geo. 5, ch. 4 (adopted by Australia in 1942, retroactive to September 3,
1939 by Act. No. 56 of 1942).
89. 28 & 29 Vict. ch. 63 (1865).
90. Id. at § 9.
91. The Australian legal convention is an annual meeting of lawyers in Australia which
is similar to an ABA convention. The significance of the 1935 Convention is that there was a
heated discussion over the riots in Kalgoorlie.
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A year earlier, riots had occurred in Kalgoorlie in the State of
Western Australia and nationals of Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece
suffered property damage. These countries' governments claimed in-
demnity against the Commonwealth Government which in turn sug-
gested that matters of law and order involved the Western Austra-
lian Government. The state government then negotiated a
settlement. As for Italy, the negotiations were held on the basis of
the accession of the then Colony of Western Australia to the Ango-
Italian Commercial Treaty of 1883. Mr. Justice Evatt of the High
Court opined that the matter was, in international law, a Common-
wealth responsibility. 92 Evatt believed that Western Australia's pro-
vision of reparations was inconsistent with establishing the Common-
wealth as sole voice in international affairs.
Chief Justice Latham, who had conducted the negotiations on
the part of Western Australia, noted that a pragmatic approach re-
quired both state and Commonwealth participation although in this
matter the Commonwealth acted primarily as conduit for state ac-
tions in providing reparations."
VIII. The Initial Approach of the High Court
A. R v. Burgess; ex parte Henry - An Initial Statement by the
High Court of Australia
In its first decision on the interplay of the Commonwealth's ex-
ternal independence and the position of the states in the federal
structure, the High Court was divided in the extent to which it was
willing to give the Commonwealth rein to legislate in pursuance of
an international undertaking. In R v. Burgess; ex parte Henry,94 a
Mr. Henry Goya Henry was convicted of flying an airplane without
a federal license in violation of Commonwealth regulations passed
pursuant to the Air Navigation Act, 1920.95 The Act purported to
implement the Convention for The Regulation of Aerial Navigation
signed in Paris on October 13, 1919.98 The validity of the Act and
the regulations was challenged as being beyond the legislative power
of the Commonwealth. The questions of law involved were issues of
first impression and, as in the practice of the High Court of Austra-
lia, individual rather than consensus opinions were delivered.
Although there was no question that aircraft involved in inter-
92. 9 Aust'l L.J. Supp. 9 (1935) (report of the Convention).
93. See O'Connell, The Evolution of Australia's International Personality in INTER-
NATIONAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 30-31 (D. O'Connell ed. 1965).
94. 55 C.L.R. 608 (Austl. 1936).
95. Commonwealth Air Navigation Act, 1920 (appears in the 1920 volume of the
Commonwealth statutes, see supra note 77).
96. Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation Oct. 13, 1919 (appears in a
schedule to the Commonwealth Air Navigation Act 1920).
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state or international commerce could be regulated by the Common-
wealth under Section 51(1) of the Constitution, 97 the defendant in
this case had been involved in purely intrastate aviation. At issue
were a plethora of constitutional conundrums;
-Which government or governments had power to make
treaties?
-Was Commonwealth power limited to subject matters other-
wise enumerated in the Constitution as being within the central gov-
ernment's power?
-Was the power to make a treaty dependent upon the power to
implement it or vice-versa or could the power to make and the power
to implement be independently invoked?
-If the powers were found independent, was there an obligation
upon the government making the treaty to consult and cooperate
with the government charged with its implementation (if different)?
-Were there any limits upon implementation?
-Could there be deviation from the words of the treaty? If so, to
what extent?
-Would the answer to the preceding question differ depending
upon whether Commonwealth or state or a combination of govern-
ments were involved at the treaty making stage?
These latter issues have particular relevance to the investor
seeking to predict the impact an international convention or treaty
might have on a project. The body of treaty law covers a wide range
of topics. For example, International Labour Organization conven-
tions can affect labor conditions and impose costs on the investor.
Shipping conventions impact upon the movement of equipment to
the project site and sale of the ultimate product, and investment co-
operation agreements direct and channel the flow of international
moneys. In a federal structure, these questions must be approached
from at least three legal perspectives: international law, the constitu-
tional framework, and statutory plus case law (as appropriate). Each
of the opinions in Burgess attempted but a partial resolution of the
questions at hand and it is instructive to observe and compare the
differing approaches.
Chief Justice Latham pointed out the difficulties of permitting
different rules for interstate aviation and intrastate aviation when
the same airports and flight paths are used. Expediency was not
however a principle of Constitutional interpretation.98 His Honor
held that there was no doubt that the Crown's power to make a
treaty was not limited and that the Statute of Westminster but for-
malized the already established independent sovereignty of Austra-
97. 55 C.L.R. 608, 625 (Austl. 1936).
98. Id. at 628.
Spring 19861
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
lia. 99 Pursuant to Section 61 of the Constitution the treaty-making
power lay with the Executive Branch of the Australian Government
formally headed by the Governor-General.' 10
The Executive acts on behalf of the Commonwealth as a nation,
not on behalf of the states.' 01 Because of the intrastate nature of the
defendant's activity in Burgess, for the legislation purporting to im-
plement the Paris Convention to be constitutionally valid, it had to
be supported by Section 51(29), the external affairs power. The
Chief Justice rejected the argument that the external affairs power
merely added an extraterritorial aspect to the internal heads of
power elsewhere allocated to the Commonwealth, this being inherent
in each such grant of power. Moreover, such an interpretation would
have made Section 51(29) meaningless as a separate source of
power. 10 2 The Chief Justice therefore concluded that Section 51(29)
did give the Commonwealth a separate and plenary power to imple-
ment treaty obligations.
The questions remaining in the Chief Justice's mind, however,
were, what would constitute implementation and how precisely did
the treaty have to be followed? The Chief Justice did not establish a
complete rule but held that some of the Commonwealth regulations
substantially conflicted with the stated fundamental principles of the
Paris Convention. Since these were not severable from those Com-
monwealth regulations which were valid, all the regulations were
held invalid and consequently the conviction of the defendant for vio-
lating them was overruled. 03
Justices Evatt and McTiernan, writing a joint opinion, also re-
jected the argument that the inseverability of intrastate and inter-
state aviation meant that the Commonwealth's power to legislate
with respect to interstate trade necessarily extended to all aircraft
engaged solely in intrastate trade. 04 Whereas the Chief Justice did
not lay down general statements of principle, but confined his opin-
ion to the precise issues at hand, the joint opinion took the opportu-
nity to more broadly examine the content of "external affairs." Evatt
and McTiernan rejected outright the view, until then followed by the
Commonwealth Government with respect to implementation of In-
ternational Labour Organization conventions, that some matters, the
subject of international agreement or the recommendation of such an
international organization, could only be legislated upon by the
states. Australian participation in an international agreement makes
99. Id. See supra note 88.
100. Id. at 644.
101. Id. at 645.
102. Id. at 639-40.
103. Id. at 654-55.
104. Id. at 677.
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the subject matter of that agreement an external affair and therefore
within the legislative power of the Commonwealth regardless of
whether that subject matter was otherwise allocated to the Common-
wealth or part of the residue left to the states. The external affairs
power is plenary and independent of the other powers.105 Evatt and
McTiernan agreed with the Chief Justice regarding the fullness of
the Executive's power to enter into an international agreement," 6
and held for invalidity on the same ground as the Chief Justice.07
Justice Dixon rejected the Evatt-McTiernan conception of a ple-
nary external affairs power. Not every treaty was "indisputably in-
ternational in character" and
it seems an extreme view that merely because the Executive
Government undertakes with some other country that the con-
duct of persons in Australia shall be regulated in a particular
way, the legislature thereby attains a power to enact that regu-
lation although it relates to a matter of internal concern which,
apart from the obligation undertaken by the Executive, could
not be considered as a matter of external affairs." 8
The warning was strictly obiter dictum since Justice Dixon expressly
held aerial navigation to be international in character.109 Unlike the
previous three opinions discussed above, Justice Dixon did not accept
the idea that all treaty obligations were external affairs. In his view,
only those treaties "indisputably international in character," such as
the one at hand, could be considered as relating to external affairs.
His Honor concurred in holding the regulations invalid for inconsis-
tency with the Convention.
To the dissenter, Justice Starke, whatever concerned Australia's
relations with other international actors was within the context of
the external affairs power." 0 Justice Starke considered the deviations
from the Paris Convention justifiable and concordant with the spirit
and purpose if not the terms of the Convention 1 ' and declined to
read an international agreement as rigidly as a statute. Upon this
liberal view, only a statute repugnant to the Treaty's object and pur-
pose would have been invalid.
In sum, the Court accepted the proposition that the Common-
wealth Executive had power to enter into treaties, that a treaty could
not be part of the law of the land without implementing legislation" 2
105. Id. at 681-82, 686.
106. Id. at 683-84.
107. Id. at 696. See supra text accompanying note 103.
108. Id. at 669.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 658-60.
III. Id. at 662-65.
112. Cf. Bradley v. Commonwealth, 128 C.L.R., 557 (Austl. 1973); Attorney General
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and that (under the opinions of the majority) all Treaties could be
implemented. However no three judges agreed as to which Govern-
ment, Commonwealth or State, could implement which treaties and
how closely the treaty had to be followed by the implementing
legislation." 3
B. Airlines of N.S.W. Pty. Ltd. v. N.S.W. (No. 2) - Incorpora-
tion of a New World Order
In 1965, the full High Court once again considered Common-
wealth regulation of intrastate aerial navigation. In Airlines of
N.S. W. Pty. Ltd. v. N.S. W. (No. 2),"" just as in R v. Burgess; ex
parte Henry," 5 a lack of consensus was evident in the judgments
delivered.
At issue in Airlines (No. 2) was an attempt on the part of the
Commonwealth to control intrastate air navigation under its Air
Navigation Regulations." 6 Airlines had to obtain a license to use
aircraft in public transport operations and the Director-General of
Civil Aviation was to consider license applications having regard
only to the "Safety, regularity and efficiency of air navigation.""' 7
The State of New South Wales challenged the Commonwealth law
because it usurped state regulatory jurisdiction.
Again at issue were competing Commonwealth and state laws
with respect to air navigation. The Commonwealth laws were argued
to be supported by one or more paragraphs of Section 51 of the Con-
stitution, namely paragraphs 1, 5, 6, 29 and 39.118 If the Common-
wealth laws were held valid, the state laws, to the extent of any in-
consistency, would be invalid pursuant to Section 109 of the
Constitution. 1 9
The Commonwealth Air Navigation Act, 1920-1963120 author-
ized the making of regulations for the purpose of carrying out and
for Canada v. Attorney General for Ontario, 1937 A.C. 326, 347.
113. As to non-treaty matters, the High Court adopted an item by item approach a year
later when it ruled that the extradition of fugitive offenders was an external affair to be dealt
with by the Commonwealth government within section 51(29) of the Constitution. Ffrost v.
Stevenson, 58 C.L.R. 528, 557 (opinion by Latham, C.J.), 601 (opinion by Evatt, J.) (Austl.
1937).
114. 113 C.L.R. 54 (Austl. 1965).
115. 55 C.L.R. 608 (Austl. 1936). See also supra text accompanying notes 94-113.
116. Air Navigation Regulations (Consolidated regulations published 1973).
117. Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation (appears in schedule to Air
Navigation Act, 1920) [hereinafter cited as Chicago Convention]; see also 113 C.L.R. 54, 93
(Austl. 1965) (opinion by Barwick, C.J.).
118. See generally Constitution, supra note 5, at § 51 (enumeration of Parliamentary
powers).
119. "When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter
shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid." Constitution,
supra note 5, at § 109.
120. Commonwealth Air Navigation Act, 1920; see supra note 77.
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giving effect to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Avia-
tion. '2 The regulations separately touched interstate and intrastate
aviation.' 22 The latter were added only after Chief Justice Dixon had
hinted at their validity in Airlines of N.S.W. Pty. Ltd. v. N.S. W.,123
an earlier case between the same parties. Like Justice Dixon in Bur-
gess, Chief Justice Barwick in Airlines of N.S.W. Pty. Ltd. v.
N.S. W. (No. 2) was not willing to hold all treaties to be within the
external affairs jurisdiction of the Australian Commonwealth. Nev-
ertheless, without establishing a general rule, Barwick held that the
Chicago Convention was such an external affair.2 4
This unpredictable case by case approach to which subject mat-
ters were sufficiently external to merit judicial approval, was particu-
larly unhelpful to a Commonwealth Government seeking to expand
its international activity. Still, some express limits on treaty imple-
mentation were established:
[W]hen a law is to be justified under the external affairs power
by reference to the existence of a treaty or a convention, the
limits of the exercise of the power will be set by the terms of
that treaty or convention, that is to say, the Commonwealth will
be limited to making laws to perform the obligations, or to se-
cure the benefits which the treaty imposes or confers on
Australia. 12 5
The Chicago Convention was aimed at creating uniform air
navigation rules. The Commonwealth did not have to wait for other
nations to pass implementing statutes or regulations, but having set
uniform rules itself the Commonwealth could not rely upon the Con-
vention to support further regulation since such regulation would go
beyond the attainment of uniformity. 2 ' The Commonwealth regula-
tions at issue in Airlines of N.S. W. Pty. Ltd. (No. 2) were expressly
intended to conform to the Chicago Convention objectives. Only
safety, regularity and efficiency of air navigation were to be consid-
ered in licensing decisions.
The Court found the legislation to be supported by Section
51(1) of the Constitution 2 7 with respect to interstate trade and com-
121. Chicago Convention, supra note 117.
122. Air Navigation Regulations; see supra note 116.
123. 113 C.L.R. I, 27 (Austl. 1964). (Commonwealth could prevent an aircraft from
carrying goods and passengers between two points within a state but could not authorize such
carriage in the face of a State law prohibiting it.)
124. Id. at 85; see also id. at 153 (opinion by Windeyer, J.).
125. Id. at 87.
126. Id.
127. Section 51(1) of the Australian Constitution states:
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for
the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:
(i) Trade and commerce with other countries, and among the States.
Constitution, supra note 5, at § 51(I).
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merce. This holding in Airlines of N.S.W. Pty. Ltd. (No. 2) was
based on the need for uniformity, an approach rejected by the Court
in Burgess.'2" Furthermore, the Court also found that no combina-
tion of plenary powers could support legislation not already sup-
ported by an explicit grant of power.' 29 Therefore, with regard to
intrastate aviation, the external affairs power was distinctly relied
upon within the limits set by the international convention, as quoted
above.130 The Commonwealth, in legislating for uniformity, clearly
sought to cover the field and preempt competing state regulations.
This was true even though the state laws were consistent with, and
additional to, the Commonwealth licensing requirements.'
The opinion of the Chief Justice in Airlines of N.S.W. Pty. Ltd.
(No. 2) appears to be broadly consistent with the views of the major-
ity in the earlier Burgess case. The refinement of requiring either
obligations or benefits that are international in character did not an-
swer the question of how precisely any implementing legislation had
to follow the terms of a Convention in order to be valid under the
external affairs power. But it was clear that once an Act was found
valid, state legislation inconsistent with the Commonwealth objective
was wholly preempted.' 32
Although they reached differing conclusions, to Justices Men-
zies, Kitto, Taylor and Owen in their opinions in the Airlines (No. 2)
case, the difficulty with including intrastate air navigation within the
external affairs power of the Commonwealth was that the regula-
tions went beyond the physical protection of interstate and interna-
tional air navigation. 3 3 Regulation 200B,' for example, purported
to override any state law prohibiting what the Commonwealth had
authorized. As a result, the uniform safety standards were trans-
formed from a minimum requirement to an exclusive regulatory con-
128. 55 C.L.R. 608, 628, 677 (Austl. 1936).
129. 113 C.L.R. at 97.
130. See supra text accompanying note 125.
131. 113 C.L.R. at 98-99.
132. The Chief Justice expressly stated, "In my opinion the Commonwealth can carry
out this obligation in advance of uniformity being achieved by other Contracting States either
within their own territories or with one another's territories." See 113 C.L.R. at 85-88. Com-
pare the Chief Justice's opinion with that of the other Justices and, in particular, with that of
Justice Menzies who wrote: "Nevertheless, the final question in a particular case is - what
are the terms of the Convention to be carried out?" Id. at 146. The Chief Justice was clearly
willing to accept the proposition that air navigation was developing at a rapid rate. In inter-
preting the Commonwealth's constitutional powers, the Chief Justice preferred a rule which
was flexible enough to accommodate technological change and growth in the public air trans-
port industries. Contrawise, the approach of Justices Menzies, Kitto, Taylor and Owen was to
look closely at the words of the treaty and confine the Commonwealth to strict compliance
with a literal interpretation of those words. These other justices arguably interpreted the law
in a vacuum - an approach which the Chief Justice did not take.
133. Id. at Ill (opinion by Kitto, J.); id. at 126 (opinion by Taylor, J.); id. at 145
(opinion by Menzies, J.); id. at 167 (opinion by Owen, J.).
134. Air Navigation Regulations, supra note 116, at 200B.
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struct. The commerce clause alone could not be relied upon to sup-
port this exclusive regulation because its scope extended beyond the
power granted under the clause. Turning to the external affairs
power, Justice Kitto looked for an established international standard
under which an international obligation to comply might exist. The
annexes to the Chicago Convention were found to deal with the air-
worthiness and operation of aircraft and the licensing of personnel,
but not the general regulation of public air transport for which inter-
national standards were yet to be developed. The Australian Consti-
tution, Justice Kitto found, did not authorize the Commonwealth to
set trends, only to follow them. This view was significantly narrower
than that expressed by the Chief Justice.135
Justices Menzies' 36 and Windeyer 3 7 expressly rejected attempts
by the states to resurrect the reserved powers doctrine in asserting
their right to regulate intra-state air commerce in the Airlines (No.
2) case. When Australia had entered into a specific treaty obligation,
its execution by means of Commonwealth legislation could validly
cover a field previously regulated by state laws. Justice Windeyer
nevertheless was cautious. His Honor expressed the opinion that
Constitutional validity was to be determined by whether the law was
"necessary" to give effect to an international obligation.138
Again disagreeing with the Chief Justice, Justices
McTiernan, 39 Kitto,' 4 ° Menzies,'" Windeyer, 1 2 and Owen, 4 3 the
other majority judges, held that no inconsistency existed between the
valid parts of the Commonwealth law and the state law at issue in
the Airlines (No. 2) case. The Commonwealth prohibited air naviga-
tion without a license which was dependent on compliance with a
uniform safety standard. The state licensing scheme was directed to-
wards economic regulation of air transport. The majority Justices
therefore concluded that the differing purposes of the two schemes
meant that each could operate without interfering with the other.
Air service operators were therefore left with two bureaucracies to
hurdle.
The majority in Airlines (No. 2) did not seek to interpret the
Chicago Convention in accordance with international law. Instead, it
identified Australia's "obligations" using common law standards of
construction. As a result, a narrow function was accorded to the ex-
135. See supra text accompanying note 132.
136. 113 C.L.R. at 143.
137. Id. at 149.
138. Id. at 152.
139. Id. at 109-10.
140. Id. at 120-22.
141. Id. at 147-48.
142. Id. at 156.
143. Id. at 168.
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ternal affairs power. 144
The Chief Justice did not follow this path. He alone was willing
to allow Commonwealth legislation under the external affairs power
to both benefit Australia's international standing under the coopera-
tive regime of the Chicago Convention and preempt state action
which might encroach on such benefit. The Commonwealth's reli-
ance on more than one Constitutional source of power raised the
problem of characterizing a law as being "with respect to" the sub-
ject matter of "external affairs" or "trade and commerce with other
countries, and among the states." That the regulations operated on
intrastate aerial commerce over which the Commonwealth lacked
power would not be a disqualification if and only if they operated on
a subject matter otherwise valid, such as compliance with an interna-
tional obligation, regulating interstate trade, or matters incidental to
the execution of such regulation. The Chief Justice found against the
suggested disqualification on the facts before the Court.
None of the justices in the Airlines (No. 2) case attempted to
define generally "external affairs." Later cases have made clear,
however, that legislative purpose is not relevant to classifying a mat-
ter as being within or without the "external affairs" power. For ex-
ample, a law limiting exports of certain minerals was held to be valid
under the commerce power notwithstanding that its objective was to
prevent an unacceptable impact to the domestic environment as a
result of the mining of the minerals."15 Air navigation was deemed
an external affair by virtue of the Chicago Convention. It could
therefore be regulated for reasons not related to commerce provided
that what was regulated was contained in the subject matter of the
Convention and was in "faithful pursuit" of the object of the Con-
vention. 146 Curiously, the incidental power was not subjected to close
scrutiny in the Airlines (No. 2) case.1 47
144. International conventions are drafted with sufficient laxity to permit states to have
differing interpretations of the same obligation without those states having to withdraw from
or denounce a particular convention. On the other hand, the subjects of any particular state do
not have such an option. They must take the law as the courts find it. Interpreting interna-
tional conventions without allowing for a laxity of interpretation is myopic in assuming that
international law can be construed and enforced much as any statute. It cannot be. Giving a
narrow function to implementation of Australia's international obligations reduces the flexibil-
ity of the Australian Government in interpreting and helping to develop international law.
145. Murphyores Inc. Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 136 C.L.R. I (Austl. 1976); cf. Her-
ald and Weekly Times Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 115 C.L.R. 418 (Austl. 1966).
146. Comments obtained from Leslie Zines, Australian National University Faculty of
Law (Professor Zines noted that the High Court will not uphold legislation whose nexus to the
objects of an international convention is not readily discernable.).
147. Powers incidental to those powers expressly granted under the Australian Constitu-
tion operate differently from the incidental powers arising under the "necessary and proper"
clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The power in Section
51(39) of the Australian Constitution was distinguished from the United States Constitution's
"necessary and proper" clause in Le Mesurier v. Conner, 42 C.L.R. 481, 497 (1929). Section
51(39) states:
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In the Airlines (No. 2) case, the Commonweatlh legislation was
upheld but constricted to operate only within the literal terms of the
Convention. Notwithstanding the High Court's decision, exclusive
regulation of air transportation by the Commonwealth now has be-
come the norm. As a practical matter, no airplane can reasonably be
subject to multiple, potentially conflicting regulations. Air travel to-
day is far too complex to be subject to more than one set of rules at
any one time and place.
C. The New Federal Balance and Treaty Implementation
The impact of "nationhood" upon the federal structure of Aus-
tralia received its strongest judicial test when two major multilateral
conventions were implemented in Australian law. The Common-
wealth Government passed the Racial Discrimination Act, 1975' 8 in
order to implement the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Convention on Racial Dis-
crimination). 4 In 1983 the Convention for the Protection of the
World Cultural and Natural Heritage (UNESCO)5 ' was imple-
mented by the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act,
1983.'5' The High Court upheld both pieces of legislation by four to
three majorities. The circumstances under which the acts were chal-
lenged and the opinions of the justices reflect the present status of
Australia's international personality and the importance of the Aus-
tralian federal structure vis A vis external affairs.
Article 2(1) of the Convention on Racial Discrimination obliges
the parties to "prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate
means, including legislation as required by circumstances, racial dis-
crimination by any persons, group or organization. " 2 Section 9 of
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for
the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:
(xxxix) matters incidental to the execution of any power vested by this
Constitution in the Parliament or in either House thereof, or in the Gov-
ernment of the Commonwealth or in the Federal Judicature, or in any
department or officer of the Commonwealth.
The Court in Le Mesurier v. Conner found that a law may be passed even though no constitu-
tional provision expressly authorizes the legislature to pass such a law so long as the subject of
the law is reasonably incidental to at least one express constitutional power.
Applying this holding to the Airlines (No. 2) case, it appears that had the court closely
considered the issue, the Court would have found that economic regulation of intrastate air
traffic lacked sufficient connection to the Commonwealth's power to pass safety rules for air
navigation. Therefore economic regulation of intrastate air commerce would not have been
held to be a reasonable and appropriate means of achieving the uniformity authorized under
the Chicago Convention.
148. Commonwealth Racial Discrimination Act, 1975 (see supra note 77).
149. 660 U.N.T.S. 194, reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966).
150. 27 U.S.T. 37; T.I.A.S. No. 8226 (ratified by Australia on August 22, 1974, becom-
ing effective on December 17, 1975).
151. Commonwealth World Heritage Properties Conservation Act, 1983.
152. Schedule to Commonwealth Racial Discrimination Act, 1975 at art. (2)(1).
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the Racial Discrimination Act outlawed racial discrimination gener-
ally and Section 12 of that same Act made unlawful racial discrimi-
nation in dealings or refusals to deal with land or housing.
The Racial Discrimination Act was tested in the case of
Koowarta v. Bjelke-Peterson.153 John Koowarta, an aboriginal, was
a prominent member of the Winychanam group of aborigines. The
group asked the Aboriginal Land Fund Commission, a federal body,
to buy certain farm land on the group's behalf. The Government of
the State of Queensland did not view favorably the acquisition of
land for development by aboriginal groups and blocked the purchase
by the Commonwealth's Aboriginal Land Fund Commission for the
use of the Winychanam group. The plaintiff, having been active in
encouraging the purchase, relied on the Racial Discrimination Act
in asserting the aboriginies' right to claim the land. The Queensland
Government challenged the validity of that Act and thus the case
went up to the High Court.
The Koowarta case focused on the question of whether Austra-
lian ratification of the Convention on Racial Discrimination was an
external affair pursuant to which the Commonwealth could legislate
under Section 51(29) of the Constitution, 15 the Commonwealth not
otherwise having power to pass human-rights legislation. The minor-
ity justices (Chief Justice Gibbs and Justices Aickin and Wilson)
rejected the view of Justices Evatt and McTiernan in the Burgess
case that giving effect to an international agreement to which Aus-
tralia is a party is always an external affair within Section 51(29).15'
In the words of the Chief Justice: "Any subject matter may consti-
tute an external affair, provided that the manner in which it is
treated in some way involves a relationship with other countries or
persons or things outside Australia." ' In other words, the Chief
Justice conceded perhaps rather unintentionally, that almost any-
thing could be found to involve a relationship with a foreign person
or country. Under Justices Evatt's and McTiernan's test, then, any
Commonwealth action would be deemed valid because it would fall
within the external affairs power of the Constitution. However, Chief
Justice Gibbs ruled that the exercise of Ministerial discretion over
whether to consent to the transfer of a Crown lease was neither a
violation of a human right nor involved an international relationship.
The minority justices, including the Chief Justice, concluded
that it was within the Executive power of the Commonwealth to
153. 39 AUSTL. L.R. 417 (1982).
154. Section 51(29) of the Constitution grants Parliament the power to legislate with
respect to "External Affairs." Constitution, supra note 5, at § 51(29).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 100-105.
156. 39 AUSTL. L.R. at 441.
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enter into the Convention but its implementation lay within that res-
idue of powers which remained the exclusive province of the states.
That there was an emerging rule of customary international law to
eliminate racial discrimination did not, in their opinion, affect the
entirely domestic operation of discrimination in the cases in which it
occurred.157 This minority view in Koowarta follows and refined the
view of Justice Dixon in the Burgess case.158 That more than one
nation were acting in concert toward a particular end did not of it-
self remove into the international arena the subject matter of con-
cern - in this case, racial equality.
One majority justice, Justice Stephen, also required the subject
matter of international agreement to be of international concern. But
Justice Stephen defined the requirement more broadly than the mi-
nority: "A subject-matter of international concern necessarily pos-
sesses the capacity to affect a country's relations with other nations
and this quality is itself enough to make a subject-matter a part of a
nation's 'external affairs.' ",159 To Justice Stephen, the content of
"external affairs" was ever growing. Obiter, His Honor found non-
discrimination on grounds of race to be part of customary interna-
tional law. Opining that action in accordance with customary inter-
national law would be a valid exercise of the external affairs power,
in Justice Stephen's opinion, the Commonwealth legislation was
valid even apart from the dictates of the Convention on Racial
Discrimination.160
Justice Brennan, one of the other majority justices, was also
concerned with discovering what factor(s) changed a matter from a
completely domestic concern to an international one, thus bringing it
within the ambit of the Commonwealth's "external affairs." Brennan
adopted a formula akin to that of Justice Stephen's. 6 ' However,
under Justice Brennan's theory, the existence of a treaty obligation
was to be treated as sufficient to cause a matter to fall within the
international arena." 2 The next step was to determine whether the
Act was in conformance with that obligation. The test for conformity
was whether a "material disconformity" existed.'6 3
Justice Mason adopted a broader test than that adopted by Jus-
tices Stephen and Brennan. The existence of a benefit to more than
one nation through international cooperation was sufficient to place a
157. 39 AUSTL. L.R. at 444 (opinion by Gibbs, C.J.); see also id. at 480 (opinion by
Wilson, J.).
158. 55 C.L.R. 608, 669 (Austl. 1936).
159. 39 AUSTL. L.R. 417, 453 (1982).
160. Id. at 456.
161. Id. at 486. See supra text accompanying notes 158-59.
162. Id. at 487.
163. Id. at 488. Presumably, it was on this point that the Burgess decision was
distinguishable.
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matter within the sphere of "external affairs." The mere fact that
the Commonwealth had entered into a treaty in a bona fide manner
was sufficient to prove such a benefit.164
The broadest view in Koowarta was expressed by Justice Mur-
phy. Murphy's opinion, expressly not shared by the other majority
justices, was that an implied constitutional prohibition against the
implementation of treaty obligations would make Australia an inter-
national cripple and was therefore unacceptable. To Justice Murphy
the continued existence of the states was the only constraint on fed-
eralism and that existence was not endangered by Commonwealth
implementation of international agreements. 65 Inherent in this view
was the proposition that so long as the states continued to exist, even
as lifeless entities, "the federal balance" would not impel invalida-
tion of Commonwealth action.
On this intergovernmental immunity question, the other justices
preferred the Payroll Tax Case formula. 66 Impairment of a state's
very capacity to act would not have been acceptable. In the justices'
opinions, the Racial Discrimination Act did not lead to such an im-
pairment. It has since been held that the Commonwealth Racial Dis-
crimination Act "covers the field" of racial discrimination law and
preempts even consistent competing State enactments. 67
Although the Racial Discrimination Act was held to be valid, a
majority of the justices looked beyond the entry of Australia into a
treaty to determine in addition if the matter was one of international
concern. This additional factor of "international concern" was not
however consistently defined. The minority judges looked for opera-
tion of the treaty upon Australia's relations with other international
persons. Justices Stephen and Brennan were willing to admit poten-
tial effects without requiring proof of actual impacts upon such rela-
tionships. Justice Brennan considered the mere entering into the in-
ternational obligation to be sufficient. This comes very close to the
broader approaches of Justices Mason and Murphy who did not
search for "international concern" as an essential element of valid-
ity. Not surprisingly, the views of learned academic commentators
on the Koowarta case have thus far been as disparate as those of the
164. Id. at 464.
165. Id. at 472-73.
166. The Payroll Tax Case held that the States were protected against Commonwealth
laws that singled them out for special treatment or impaired their capacity to function. See id.
at 433 (opinion by Gibbs, C.J.); see also id. at 459 (opinion by Mason, J.). See also supra
note 42 and accompanying text.
167. Viskavskas v. Niland, 47 AUSTL. L.R. 32 (1983). (Both Section 13 of the Racial
Discrimination Act, 1975 (C'th) and Section 17 of the Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977 (NSW)
prohibited racial discrimination in the provision of goods and services to the public but differed
with regard to enforcement. It did not avail the state to suggest that it was possible to obey
both laws since the Commonwealth Act covered the field and preempted the State Act).
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judges who heard the case."'
Five of the justices (Chief Justice Gibbs and Justices Mason,
Murphy, Wilson and Brennan) also heard the later case of Common-
wealth v. Tasmania, known as the Franklin Dam case, 16 9 along with
Justices Deane and Dawson. The opinions traversed the breadth of
the external affairs power and its interaction with the concept of fed-
eral balance. The decision had the important political consequence of
stopping the construction of a dam in the South West Tasmania
Wilderness area - a victory for conservationists over the Hydro
Electric Corporation of Tasmania.
In 1982, a part of the Southwest Tasmania Wilderness had
been placed on the World Heritage List as a site worthy of conserva-
tion from an international perspective. The list was and is main-
tained pursuant to the Convention for the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage of 1972.170 Australia ratified this
Convention on August 22, 1974171 and on December 17, 1975 it en-
tered into force. A function of the World Heritage List is to promote
conservation. The Southwest Tasmania Wilderness area was listed
with the support of the Government of the Commonwealth of
Australia.
The Government of the State of Tasmania, however, favored
commercial development of the Southwest Tasmania Wilderness, be-
ginning with the construction of a dam. It desired to attract new
industry through the provision of cheap electric power, a theme all
too familiar to American states. Economic growth and employment
opportunities were thereby expected to be promoted. When the Aus-
tralian Labor Party returned to power in March 1983, it promptly
set its own priorities for the wilderness and the archeological sites
that had been unearthed there. These priorities favored conservation
over the dam development. Flooding the wilderness and drowning
the archaeological discoveries were events which the new Common-
wealth government had made an election pledge to prevent. It passed
regulations under the existing National Parks and Wildlife Act,
19751" and shortly afterwards enhanced this action by enacting the
168. See e.g., M. COPER, supra note 2, at 6; see generally, Byrnes and Charlesworth,
supra note 3: see also Finnis, The Power to Enforce Treaties in Australia - The High Court
Goes Centrist?, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 126 (1983); Crock, Federalism and the External
Affairs Power, 14 MELB. U. L. REV. 238, 252-56 (1983); Note, Koowarta v. Bjelke-Peterson
and Others State of Queensland v. Commonwealth of Australia, 13 FED. L. REV. 360 (1983);
Note, Koowarta v. Bjelke-Peterson and Others Queensland v. Commonwealth of Australia -
External Affairs Power, 13 MELB. U. L. REV. 635 (1982); Lane, The Federal Parliament's
External Affairs Power: Koowarta's Case, 56 AUSTL. L.J. 519 (1982).
169. 46 AUSTL. L.R. 625 (1983).
170. See Natural Heritage Convention, supra note 4.
171. National Parks and Wildlife Act, 1975.
172. Id.
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World Heritage Properties Conservation Act, 1983173 to more fully
implement the Natural Heritage Convention.
In resolving the legal issues presented in the Franklin Dam
case, the High Court had to determine first the state of the law as
the Koowarta decision had left it. Because the reasoning of the ma-
jority justices in Koowarta was not consistent, the applicable rules
remained unsettled.
Dealing first with the views of the minority justices in the
Franklin Dam case, Chief Justice Gibbs and Justice Wilson regret-
fully abandoned the minority view in the earlier Koowarta case.
74
Instead, Chief Justice Gibbs and Justice Wilson adopted the test
propounded by Justice Stephen. 7' To make a matter which affected
Australia's overseas relations an external affair pursuant to which
legislation could be passed, the test required a judgment regarding
the degree of, rather than the mere existence of, the international
concern involved.' 7 6 Emphasis was placed upon the extent of the ob-
ligation expressed in the language of the convention, in this case the
Natural Heritage Convention. An absolute "undertaking" was
stronger than an "endeavor, insofar as possible and as appropriate
for each country."'1 77 Indeed the latter type suggested the absence of
an international legal obligation because not only the modalities but
the very taking of action to protect the natural and cultural heritage
lay within the discretion of each party state.178
In determining the degree of international concern, the Chief
Justice in the Franklin Dam case acknowledged that the existence of
an international convention is not necessary to activate the external
affairs power.'19 However, if a convention exists, it is relevant to dis-
cover whether any action by Australia within her own borders in-
volves reciprocal or mutual response by other party states. 8 ' Al-
lowing one's natural heritage to be destroyed, he found, would not in
all probability raise the ire of the world community as would the
racial discrimination present in the Koowarta case. 18
Justice Wilson also referred to the significantly lesser number of
signatories to the Natural Heritage Convention as opposed to the
173. Heritage Properties Conservation Act, 1983.
174. 46 AUST'L. L.R. 625 at 666 (opinion by Gibbs, C.J.), 742 (Wilson, J.).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 670, 743-44.
177. See Natural Heritage Convention, supra note 4.
178. 46 AUSTL. L.R. at 658, 661-63 (opinion by Gibbs, C.J.) and 746-47 (opinion by
Wilson, J.) and 847-48 (opinion by Dawson, J.).
179. Id. at 667 (opinion by Gibbs, C.J.) and 745 (opinion by Wilson, J.).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 670-71. The Chief Justice distinguished Franklin Dam from Koowarta on
this point: racial discrimination would instigate world-wide reaction, whereas alteration of the
environment within a state's own borders would result in very few, if any sanctions from
abroad.
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Racial Discrimination Convention as an indicator of an insufficient
degree of "international concern. 182 If the external affairs power
might be exercised in the absence of an obligation or a sufficient
degree of international concern, there remained the question of how
precisely the implementing legislation needed to follow the Conven-
tion in order to be valid. The view of Justice Dixon in Burgess 8' was
adopted by Chief Justice Gibbs to hold that "the Commonwealth
can do no more than endeavour to persuade the states to give effect
to the recommendation [contained in the Convention] by exercising
the legislative power which they possess and the Commonwealth
does not."' 84 Based on this view, and in the absence of any relevant
obligation in the Convention, the implementation of legislation by
the Commonwealth would be merely hortatory.
A number of difficulties are brought to light by Chief Justice
Gibbs' and Justice Wilson's application of Justice Stephen's
Koowarta formula. The emphasis placed upon the sufficient degree
of "international concern" suggests that the Commonwealth's exter-
nal affairs power is to be limited by the extent of the external obliga-
tions arising out of that international concern, at least with respect
to subject matters physically internal to Australia. What is not ad-
mitted by these two minority justices is that international law in-
cludes both hard and soft obligations. 85 Among the many defects in
this view is that by refusing to uphold legislation giving effect to the
soft obligation in the Natural Heritage Convention, the legislative
practice of Australia would be restrained from contributing to the
progressive development of international law. Gibbs and Wilson
would not permit the diminution of State powers unless the Com-
monwealth was internationally obliged to act. This view fails to real-
ize that Commonwealth legislation, once enacted and implemented,
is part of the stuff of which international law is made. Fortunately
the majority opinions expressly repudiated each of the bases of the
minority opinions. The minority in the Franklin Dam case sought to
restrain Australia's contribution to the progressive development of
international law by subjecting Commonwealth legislation to a so-
called doctrine of "federal balance" which was and is nothing more
than an attempt to revive the reserved powers doctrine.
The other minority justice in the Franklin Dam case, Justice
182. Id. at 750.
183. 55 C.L.R. at 674-75.
184. 46 AUSTL. L.R. at 674; see also id. at 752 (opinion by Wilson, J.).
185. "Hard" obligations are those that are written in mandatory rather than permissive
language in treaties or other international agreements and are therefore formally binding on
state parties. A state has some discretion on the other hand, in determining how best to con-
form to a "soft" obligation. The difference between "hard" and "soft" obligations lies in the
extent to which a nation has discretion over the modalities of implementation.
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Dawson, broke from tradition and relied in part upon the omission of
an express treaty making power in the drafting history of the Consti-
tution. Dawson proceeded cautiously having primary regard to the
maintenance of a federal balance.' 86 He was willing to assume, with-
out so deciding, that the Convention did impose obligations upon
Australia but not that it involved a relationship external to Austra-
lia. 87 Justice Dawson therefore declined to accept the idea that the
Commonwealth of Australia could agree with other nations to regu-
late internal conduct according to international standards. Effec-
tively, this view can only be consistent with the approach of the mi-
nority in Koowarta.18 8 It may safely be concluded that Justice
Dawson was alone in holding to that rule following upon its aban-
donment by Chief Justice Gibbs and Justice Wilson in the present
case.
189
All the majority justices in Franklin Dam rejected the require-
ment of an international obligation. 9 ' As in Koowarta, Justice Mur-
phy adopted the broader approach followed by Justices Evatt and
McTiernan in Burgess. As to the value of limiting the Common-
wealth's power in order to maintain some federal balance, Justice
Murphy stated: "The mere fact that the acts impair, undermine,
make ineffective or supercede various State functions of State laws
in an ordinary consequence of Federal Acts and does not affect their
validity."' 9' The opinion went further and, roundly disavowing the
minority opinions, suggested that if any extra-Constitutional notions
of federal balance were to be implied, the electors rather than the
courts should effect them.1 92 In adopting this approach, Justice Mur-
phy continued to follow closely the Engineers' admonition against
judicially remaking the federal compact. This was a task for the po-
litical process in a democracy.
In holding for the Evatt-McTiernan view, Justice Mason also
declined to substitute his judgment for that of the Executive in de-
ciding whether a matter was of sufficient international concern for
Australia to join an international convention. The assumption was
made that Australia would not have joined unless the Executive an-
ticipated some benefit to Australia. 93 The duty of Australia to fulfill
186. 46 AUSTL. L.R. at 838-41.
187. Id. at 849.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 154-57.
189. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
190. 46 AUSTL. L.R. at 691 (opinion of Mason, J.) and 729 (opinion of Murphy, J.) and
772 (opinion of Brennan, J.) and 806 (opinion of Deane, J.).
191. Id. at 728; cf. id. at 703 (opinion of Mason, J.) and 772 (opinion of Brennan, J.)
and 824 (opinion of Deane, J.).
192. Id. at 728; cf. id. at 693 (opinion of Mason, J.). Compare Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
193. 46 AUSTL. L.R. at 692.
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its promise of international cooperation was a sufficient obligation, if
an obligation was necessary to invoke the external affairs power. Jus-
tice Mason did not adopt this requirement. 194 Because the means of
implementation were left open to each party state's discretion, Jus-
tice Mason believed that no precision of conformity to the language
of the Convention was required. Nevertheless, legislation did need to
conform to the ultimate object of the Convention."
Justice Brennan analyzed the judgment of Justice Stephen in
Koowarta and held that the existence of an obligation and interna-
tional concern were alternatives, either of which would suffice to ac-
tivate the external affairs power.196 Justice Brennan firmly repudi-
ated the minority opinions and ruled that failure to legislate for the
protection of Australia's heritage would harm Australia's relations
with the other party States.'9 7
Justice Deane, in his opinion in Franklin Dam, advocated a test
for a "reasonable proportionality" between the legislation and the
Convention's "purpose or object.' 9 8 Noting that international agree-
ments are generally less precise than domestic common law docu-
ments, particularly where 70 parties and five authoritative languages
had to be accommodated, the language found non-obligatory by the
minority, i.e., "Endeavour, insofar as possible, and as appropriate for
each country"' 99 was to be considered obligatory. 200 Justice Deane,
joined by Justice Brennan, did not find all the implementing regula-
tions wholly referable to the Natural Heritage Convention's purpose
and object but upheld those which satisfied this criterion and were
severable and saveable.
It is interesting to note that one minority judge in both the
Franklin Dam and the Koowarta cases, Justice Wilson, referred in
Koowarta to the United States Supreme Court decision in National
League of Cities v. Usery,20' to support the protection of "tradi-
tional" state functions. In the American case it was ruled that apply-
ing federal fair labor standards to employees of states and state sub-
divisions impermissibly interfered with a traditional state function.
Nation League of Cities v. Usery presented the United States courts
with the unenviable task of identifying those state functions which
either were or were not "traditional." Just last year, in Garcia v. San
194. Id. at 698.
195. Id. at 703. At this point, the opinion drifted away from the line of Justices Evatt
and McTiernan to a position closer to the dissent of Justice Starke in Burgess.
196. Id. at 772.
197. Id. at 777. Cf. the opinions of Chief Justice Gibbs and Justice Wilson noted at text
accompanying notes 180-81.
198. 46 AUSTL. L.R. at 806.
199. Natural Heritage Convention, supra note 4; see 44 AUSTL. L.R. at 808.
200. Id. at 808.
201. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,0 2 Usery was expressly
overruled. Justice Blackmun delivered the majority opinion and cited
with approval the words of James Madison to members of the first
Congress: "Interference with the power of the States was no consti-
tutional criterion of the power of Congress. If the power was not
given, Congress could not exercise it; if given, they might exercise it,
although it should interfere with the laws, or even the Constitution
of the States. °2 0 3 The strong dissent in Garcia parallels the dissents
in Koowarta and the Franklin Dam case.
On both sides of the Pacific it is apparent that the issues of
federal balance are not innately soluble. Federalism is a system of
government, not a system of values. The judges, legislators and ad-
ministrators who operate the system do so according to their own
values and, as the personnel change, so do the values applied. At
least from a judicial perspective, the majority values in both the
United States and Australia are similar. States' capacities to act are
to be preserved. The exercise of that capacity remains subject to the
valid exercise of federal powers, especially when the federal power is
used to implement international law. When questions regarding the
implementation of international agreements arise, not only national
but international uniformity is at stake and this uniformity is partic-
ularly highly valued by the present day majority.
On a more practical plane, the result of Garcia was that the
employees of a local transit authority would receive minimum guar-
anteed fair employment conditions; in Koowarta the denial of land
rights on racial grounds was prohibited. Thus the promotion of uni-
form law had the very sort of effects its original creators had in-
tended. Persons from outside the local jurisdiction could predict their
legal rights in the jurisdiction because the law in effect would be the
same. In both Garcia and Koowarta uniformity promoted a higher
common denominator for individual liberty than would be the case
under divergent state by state regulation. Since protection of the in-
dividual was not the stated premise of the judicial reasoning, the de-
cisions provide no long term solace for advocates of individual rights.
They do, however, give comfort to advocates of legal and commercial
certainty on the national and international level. Perhaps this is the
lesson of the decision in the Franklin Dam case.
In the final analysis, and as a result of Australian case law de-
velopment, a United States corporation conducting minerals explora-
tion in Australia can work from international law down through na-
tional or Commonwealth law to local or state law and predict the
202. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985); see also United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail
Road Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
203. 105 S. Ct. at 1017, citing 2 Annals of Cong. 1897 (1791).
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legal consequences of its intended actions. Of key importance is the
need to resist the temptation to dialogue only with the local authori-
ties and ignore the impact of intergovernmental and international
relations.
IX. Conclusion - The Rule as the Franklin Dam Case Left It
Importantly, the majority justices' reasons in the Franklin Dam
case have enough in common to reach confidently the conclusion that
the Evatt-McTiernan view has finally asserted itself as the rule ap-
plicable to the external affairs power. In sum, the Commonwealth
may legislate with respect to:
- matters physically external to Australia;
- matters involving a legal obligation toward or a legal benefit
derivable from Australia's international relations. The legal
character is to be determined under the standards of interna-
tional law rather than under those required by the common law.
In addition, the conformity of implementing legislation must be
sufficient to be "appropriate to the object and purpose" of its
international source;
- Unless Commonwealth legislation discriminates against a
state or states or the capacity of the state or states to function is
impaired, any alteration of the federal balance is to be tolerated;
- The states themselves have no international personality and
have no right of legation but may be granted analogous privi-
leges by the Commonwealth itself. They may participate in Aus-
tralia's international relations insofar as the Commonwealth will
allow such participation, upon consideration of the state's inter-
est involved, if any.
With regard to continuing judicial contributions to these devel-
opments, Professor Coper has written,
The Constitution does not itself effect any particular federal bal-
ance, that is achieved by judges making deliberate choices be-
tween competing interpretations . . . . The truth is that some
justices read the Constitution as requiring the preservation of a
limited concept of central power, whereas others read it as mak-
ing provision for adaptation to changing circumstances." 4
The role of the High Court as arbiter between the state and
Commonwealth governments in a federal system has both affected
and been affected by the growth of Australia into a mature interna-
tional actor and the expanded reliance of the Commonwealth on the
external affairs power. The slow change of the states from a position
of competing with the Commonwealth for international status to one
204. M. COPER, supra note 3, at 23-24.
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of negotiating for greater consultation in the process of international
decision making admits the ascendancy of the Commonwealth. The
pattern has been evolutionary and has led to a federal structure with
internal adaptability and external maturity.
